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STUDENT COMMENT
ACCOUNTANTS' LIABILITIES TO THIRD PARTIES
UNDER COMMON LAW AND
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
A recent decision in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York raises unique and interesting issues with respect to the
duties of accountants to persons other than their clients. In Fischer 7i. Kletz,'
the defendant accountants, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell and Company (PMM),2
honestly and carefully, but nevertheless falsely, represented the financial
status of Yale Motor Transport Company (Yale) 3 on balance sheets which
were known to be for the use of the investing and lending public. The balance
sheets showed a substantial net income for the fiscal period in question, when
in fact, there was a substantial loss. Upon a re-examination of Yale's status, 4
PMM discovered facts which indicated the error in the original audit. PMM
informed Yale of the factual discovery and alerted Yale to the misrepresenta-
tive character of the balance sheet; neither PMM nor Yale took any further
action. Subsequently, Yale went into bankruptcy. Those purchasers of Yale
securities who had acquired their securities after PMM's discovery brought
suit for damages against PMM under the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and for common law deceit. PMM moved
to dismiss, raising a major legal issue: whether accountants have a duty to
the investing and lending public to disclose misrepresentations discovered
after the distribution of their certified balance sheets. The court overruled
PMM's motions to dismiss and determined that accountants may be obliged
both at common law and under the securities legislation to disclose such mis-
representations. This comment will consider the issues raised by Fischer v.
Kletz against the general background of accountants' obligations to persons
other than their clients under both the common and statutory law.
T. COMMON LAW
A. The Foundations of Liability
1. Deceit—The Duty of Honesty. An action in tort for deceit can be
brought against a person who intentionally misrepresents a material fact to
another who justifiably relies thereon and is thereby damaged.° A fact is
1 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). For other published materials dealing with
this controversy, see Fischer v. Kletz, 249 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (motion to
stay pending resolution of factual questions by the ICC); 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (motion for determination of class in class actions) ; CCH Fed. Sec. .L. Rep.
¶ 91,835 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (motion for discovery); CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ¶ 91,866
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (motion to intervene in class action); Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae,
Fischer v. Kletz, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 91,844 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
2 See generally Fortune, July 1, 1966, at 88.
3 See generally Fortune, November, 1965, at 144.
4 266 F. Supp. at 183.
See generally W. Prosser, Torts § 102, at 713-19 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as
Prosser].
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material if it would invite reliance by a reasonable man!' There seems to be
little doubt that the accountant's balance sheet may encourage or discourage
a prospective purchaser or seller. The facts stated therein are therefore ma-
terial. It is also quite certain that the reliance of the ordinary creditor or in-
vestor on the balance sheet is justified. Indeed, a primary function of the
balance sheet is to provid6 information to those who are concerned with the
financial condition of the company audited. Neither will a serious problem
of causation be presented with respect to the accountant's deceit, since, if the
defendant had represented truly, the plaintiff investor or lender would not
have been injured. The true facts would have come to his attention either
directly or indirectly (as through a stockbroker), and he would not have
invested or lent.
While the elements of materiality of the misrepresentation, justifiability
of reliance, and causative connection between the harm done and the defen-
dant's statement may concern courts in deceit cases, it is the element of intent,
scienter, which most frequently invites discussion? Scienter clearly exists
when the speaker knows that his statement is false. When the speaker's frame
of mind is less than one of intent to mislead, courts have enlarged scienter to
include recklessness. 8 In Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 9 for example, the de-
fendant accountants were employed by the Stern Company to perform the
yearly audit of the company's books. The defendants overvalued the company's
assets, and the overvaluation was incorporated in the balance sheet upon which
the plaintiffs, creditors of the company, subsequently relied in extending
credit. When the company failed, the plaintiffs sought recovery of the loans
made, alleging that the defendants' overvaluation was fraudulent, or at least
negligent. The New York Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Cardozo,
held that the defendants owed relying parties a duty of honesty imposid by
law. While the record did not reveal facts sufficient to support a finding of
fraud, it did show that the defendants' conduct was sufficiently reckless to
support an inference of fraud. In State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst," the holding
of Ultramares on the issue of recklessness was further extended. The defen-
dant accountants released to their clients a balance sheet which listed accounts
receivable as assets, when in fact it was doubtful whether 38 percent of those
receivables would ever be collected. An explanatory covering letter was not
sent to possible lenders or investors until thirty days after the balance sheet
was sent. In the interim, the plaintiffs had extended credit to the client com-
pany. When the company failed, the plaintiff creditors sued, alleging fraud.
0
 Restatement of Torts § 538(2)(a) (1938).
7 See generally Prosser § 102, at 715-16.
8 For some time the common law failed to recognize a cause of action in deceit for
negligent misrepresentation. If a defendant could show an honest belief on his part in
the truth of the representation at the time of its making, then the complainant had no
grounds for suit, even if the defendant had negligently misrepresented. Because this rule
worked harsh results by denying to innocent relying parties recoveries against misrepre-
senting defendants who were at fault, the rule developed that scienter will be imputed
to a speaker who makes a representation either with reckless disregard whether it be
true or false, or conscious that he has no basis in fact to so represent.
9 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
10 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
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The trial court set aside a verdict for plaintiffs and directed a verdict for de-
fendants. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, saying:
A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if
sufficiently gross, may furnish evidence leading to an inference of
fraud so as to impose liability for losses suffered by those who rely
on the balance sheet. In other words, heedlessness and reckless dis-
regard of consequence may take the place of deliberate intention."
In summary, then, to recover against an accountant for deceit, an injured
creditor or investor must show an intentional or reckless misrepresentation in a
balance sheet upon which he has justifiably relied.
2. Negligent Misrepresentation—The Duty of Care. The elements of
negligent misrepresentation are a duty of care and its breach, resulting in harm
to the plaintiff. The duty of care is created in the case of an accountant when
be contractually undertakes to perform his services. What is "reasonable care
under the circumstances" with respect to accountants is determined by a
factual consideration of accounting practice and procedure." The duty of care
is breached by failure to meet minimal standards of accounting practice and
procedure, resulting in a balance-sheet misrepresentation." The causative
connection between the harm done and the accountant's misrepresentation is
determined by the application of the "but for" rule of causation, as in the
action for deceit." To whom the accountant is liable for breach of the duty of
care will be considered in a later section.
3. Strict Liability—The Duty of Correctness. Strict liability for repre-
sentations neither fraudulent nor careless, but nevertheless false, has been
recognized by both law and equity." When one party induces another to
contract by means of an innocent misrepresentation, equity recognizes a right
of rescission." Moreover, a damage remedy has become available to a party
induced to contract by an innocent misrepresentation of the other party:17 In
addition, in Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 18 a consumer-third party, who pur-
chased a chattel from a retail dealer in reliance on the innocent but false
representations of the chattel's manufacturer, was allowed as damages from
the chattel's manufacturer the difference between the actual value of the
chattel and its value if it were as represented. The plaintiff, having relied on
Ford manuals and advertising, purchated a Ford tractor from a local dealer.
When the tractor failed to operate as represented the plaintiff sought from
Ford the pecuniary loss which allegedly resulted from Ford's false representa-
tion. The court relied heavily on two sections of the Restatement (Second) of
11 Id. at 112, 15 N.E.2d at 418-19.
12 See generally Committee on Auditing Procedure, Am. Inst. of Accountants, Gener-
ally Accepted Auditing Standards (1954); Hawkins, Professional Negligence Liability
of Public Accountants, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 797, 802-09 (1959); Rouse, Legal Liability of
the Public Accountant, 23 Ky. L.J. 1, 11-37 (1934).
13 See Hawkins, supra note 12, at 804-09.
14 See id. at 800; Rouse, supra note 12, at 37-39.
15 Prosser	 102, at 724.
18 Fields v. Haupert, 213 Ore. 179, 181, 323 P.2d 332, 333 (1958).
17 Stein v. Treger, 182 F.2d 696, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
18 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966).
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Torts—section 402B 19
 and the proposed section 552D.2° Both sections are
closely related to the growth of strict liability in the products area, and both
seek to fill gaps in the development of strict liability for products injurious
to either person, property, or pocketbook. Section 402A of the Restatement 2 '
would impose such liability on the manufacturer if the product was defective
and, therefore, dangerous when it left the manufacturer's control. The show-
ing of a defect is essential to a section 402A recovery. Section 402B and pro-
posed section 552D impose the same liability. A manufacturer is liable for
harm resulting from a product even though he does not sell the product to the
injured person, is careful in both manufacture and inspection, and does not
release the product in a defective condition, as long as he makes representa-
tions about the product which induce its purchase and which turn out to be
false.
No court has attempted to analogize strict liability for false representa-
tions in the products area to the area of service contracts. Dean Prosser has,
however, hinted that strict liability for misrepresentation is an expanding
area, and that there may be no significant reason to distinguish between mis-
representations related to contracts for the sale of goods and those related to
contracts of service. 22 Thus, an accountant who performs his services with
both honesty and utmost care could be held liable if he misrepresents the
actual financial status of the corporation audited.
Several reasons militate against such a rule of liability. First, there is a
fundamental difference between the sale of goods and the performance of
]ll Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402B (1964) states:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels,
or otherwise, makes-to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact con-
cerning the character or quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability
for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel caused by justifiable reliance
upon the misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
20 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552D (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1966) states:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or
otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning
the character or quality of a chattel soli by him is subject to liability for pecu-
niary loss caused to another by his purchase of the chattel in justifiable
reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though it is not made fraudulently
or negligently.
21
 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1964) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
2.2
 Prosser § 102, at 725-27.
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services.23 The end result sought from the manufacturer in the sale of goods
transaction is a product which is sold to the consumer and which will do him
no harm. That end result is most probably going to be reached as long as the
manufacturer runs a quality operation. The manufacturer controls the environ-
ment of production and can reduce variables which might produce defects. In
the service contract, the end result sought,,the solution to a particular prob-
lem, is often beyond the control of the performing party. What is really bar-
gained for is the practical experience and knowledge of the performing party,
which, it is hoped, will produce the desired result. Often, however, that result is
not produced, precisely because unknown or uncontrollable factors intervene
and destroy the effectiveness of the servicer's performance. Certainly, no com-
pelling argument can be made for rendering doctors strictly liable when they
perform their services at a level of skilled competence but nevertheless fail to
cure the patient. Any attempt to impose such a liability on an accountant is
an attempt to impose a perfection of result impossible of achievement.
There are further reasons militating against a rule of strict liability. It
should be noted that the accountant derives no direct benefit from his mis-
representation. In the products area, on the other hand, representations are
made in propaganda selling devices which increase sales and thereby increase
the manufacturer's profits. Recovery against he who has derived financial
benefits as a direct result of his misrepresentations has a restitutional nature,
completely lacking in cases of recovery against a party who innocently mis-
represents but does not take any benefits from that misrepresentation. It is
for this reason that "liability has been rather narrowly limited to defendants
who have some pecuniary interest in making the representation, to the exclu-
sion of others." 24 Furthermore, a rule of strict liability might work a funda-
mental injustice on accountants. If a client hid liabilities or inflated assets in
such a way that even great care on the part of the accountant could not dis-
cover the fraud, the rule of strict liability would shackle the accountant with
liability to creditors or investors injured by the fraud of another. 25 Finally, the
historical development of misrepresentation has been restrictive. The barriers
to third-party recovery for negligent misrepresentation are just now being
broken. In view of this, any development of strict liability concepts in the
area of accountants' representations seems improbable.26
23 See Comment, Contract Formation and the Law of Warranty: A Broader Use of
the Code, 8 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 81, 87-89 (1966).
24 Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 231, 237-38 (1966).
25 See Hawkins, supra note 12, at 799-802.
26 Much of the development of strict liability in the products area has been based
on the economic theory of "enterprise liability." According to this theory, the risk of
loss from defective products is placed upon the manufacturer rather than the individual
consumer or user, since the manufacturer can insure against the risk and pass the cost
of insurance off to his buyers, thus spreading the risk of Loss over the entire group of
buyers. The same type of economic reasoning is applicable to the service area. If strict
liability is imposed on accountants, they will insure, passing the costs of premiums onto
their customers, the businesses who use their services. In turn, the businesses will pass
the costs onto the consumers of their products or services. Thus, the risk of loss from
accountants' mistakes is spread over a broad group at a, low cost per person. On the
other hand, if accountants are relieved of strict liability, the risk of loss is cast upon
the investing and lending public. While it is theoretically possible that every lender
or creditor could insure against the risk of loss from a balance-sheet mistake, it is
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B. The Extent of Liability
1. The Extent of Liability for Deceit. 27
 Because deceit is an intentional
tort, the legal fundamentalist, analogizing to torts such as battery, is inclined
to apply the doctrine of transferred intent and to conclude that any person
injured by the deceit in the manner intended by the speaker is entitled to
recover, even if the representation was not directed at that person. In fact, the
law at first severely limited the liability of an intentional misrepresenter. In
Peek v. Gurney, 28 Lord Cairns stated:
Every man must be held responsible for the consequences of a false
representation made by him to another, upon which a third person
acts, and so acting is injured or damnified, provided it appear that
such false representation was made with the intent that it should be
acted upon by such third person in the manner that occasions the
injury or loss. 29 (Emphasis added.)
Apparently, the House felt that any other rule would allow limitless liability,
wholly disproportionate to the wrong. In the usual case of transferred intent,
the complainant is almost invariably one person, whereas, from its nature, the
intentional misrepresentation may continue far beyond its original intended
ambit to a limitless group of prospective plaintiffs. Indeed, it is the limitless
character of liability that is critical; for members of large but quantitatively
defined groups can recover under the rule of Peek v. Gurney as long as the
misrepresentation is intended to influence them.
The modern rule, precipitated by Judge Cardozo's decision on the issue
of deceit in Mtramares,3° has extended the ambit of an intentional misrepre-
senter's liability to those persons whom the speaker should reasonably have
foreseen would be injured by his misrepresentation. While this rule increases
the liability of the intentional misrepresenter, it clearly defines its limits and
thus is not subject to the objection of limitless liability raised by the House in
Peek v. Gurney. There are several justifications which support the modern
praCtically improbable. Consequently, a single individual lender or creditor is apt to
be subjected to an extensive loss. Furthermore, from a logical point of view, it is prob-
ably far more feasible to establish rates at which accountants could be covered than
rates at which investors or lenders could be covered.
It should be noted that no court has considered the application of "enterprise lia-
bility" to the service area.
27 See generally Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liability for Defective Financial
Reports, 15 Hastings L.J. 436, 450-60 (1964); Meek, Liability of the Accountant to
Parties Other Than His Employer for Negligent Misrepresentation, 1942 Wis. L. Rev.
371-77; Prosser, supra note 24; Note, The Accountant's Liability—For What and To
Whom, 36 Iowa L. Rev. 319, 321-22 (1951).
28
 L.R. 6 H.L. 377 (1873). The defendant promoters of a corporation issued a
prospectus in order to induce the investing public to purchase the corporation's first
allotment of ownership shares. The plaintiff, who received and read the prospectus which
contained a material misrepresentation, did not purchase from the corporation but rather
purchased a few months later in the market. When the corporation failed, the plaintiff
brought suit. The House of Lords denied recovery, limiting the defendants' liability
exclusively to recipients of the prospectus who purchased the original allotment, since
they only were those whom the defendants intended to induce by the prospectus.
29 Id. at 413.
30 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441.
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rule.34 First, it would be anomalous for the liability of the intentional mis-
representer to be more limited than that of the negligent wrongdoer in personal
injury and property damage cases. Since liability extends to foreseeability in
those cases it should extend at least as far in intentional misrepresentation
cases. Second, the choice between the intentionally tortious defendant and the
innocent injured plaintiff is usually made in favor of the innocent party,
unless some compelling policy factor dictates otherwise. Third, the modern
rule may have some deterrent effect on future misconduct. It is submitted that
the modern rule which extends liability to the limits of foreseeability is a better
rule than the older, more limited, rule.
2. The Extent of Liability for Negligent Misrepresentation. Many legal
writers have concluded that accountants, if negligent, should be liable to cer-
tain third persons injured as a result of their negligence." Nevertheless, no
appellate court decision, English or American, has ever held an accountant
liable to a third person for negligent misrepresentation. To understand the
present state and tendency of the law of extent of liability for negligent mis-
representation, in particular as it relates to accountants, it is necessary to
consider briefly earlier law relating to legally imposed duties which may
arise out of contractual relationships.
The earlier common law rule was that the only duties arising out of a
contractual relation were contractual duties and a duty of careful performance
owed by each party to the other; that is, all duties were bounded by privity of
contract." With the development of negligence theory, that rule was replaced
by the general principle that a contractor owes a duty of care imposed by law
to those persons who could foreseeably be injured should the contract not be
performed with care. 34 Although many cases extended and refined this prin-
ciple, it has received only slight acceptance in services cases where economic
loss has followed from a negligent misrepresentation.33
In Glanzer v. Shepard," however, the New York Court of Appeals ex-
tended this negligence principle into the area of economic loss caused by
misrepresentation. In that case, the defendant, a professional weigher and
certifier, contracted with a bean vendor to weigh a shipment of beans and to
forward certificates to both the plaintiff vendee and the vendor of the ship-
ment. The plaintiff paid his seller for the beans in accordance with their weight
as represented by the defendant's certificate. When it turned out that the
beans did not weigh as much as represented, and that therefore the buyer had
acquired less than he paid for, he sought the difference in damages. Recovery
was allowed on the ground that the defendant had negligently misrepresented,
31 See generally P. Keeton, The Ambit of a Fraudulent Representor's [sic] Respon-
sibility, 17 Texas L. Rev. 1 (1938).
32 E.g., Hawkins, supra note 12, at 818-21; Levitin, supra note 27, at 449-50;
Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co., Negligent Misrepresentation by Accountants,
67 L.Q. Rev. 466, 473-81 (1951).
33 E.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 159 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
34 E.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
35 E.g., Jaillet v. Cashman, 235 N.Y.. 511, 139 N.E. 714 (1923), aff'g per curiam
202 App. Div. 805, 194 N.Y. Supp. 947 (1922), aff'g mem. 115.Misc. 383, 189 N.Y.Supp.
743 (1921).
38 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.H. 275 (1922).
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and that the plaintiff's reliance was the very aim and purpose of the certificate.
Citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.," 7 the court said:
In such circumstances, assumption of the task of weighing was the
assumption of a duty to weigh carefully for the benefit of all whose
conduct was to be governed. We do not need to state the duty in
terms of contract or of privity. Growing out of a contract, it has
none the less an origin not exclusively contractual. Given the con-
tract and the relation, the duty is imposed by law... .
. . . Constantly the bounds of duty are enlarged by knowledge
of a prospective use . . . . 38 (Emphasis added.)
Glanzer was received as a logical development of the risk theory of liability.
Virtually all observers surmised that it stood for the proposition that one who
negligently misrepresents a material fact will be liable to foreseeable third
persons, who rely on the misrepresentations and are economically injured as a
result." This surmise was, however, modified by the subsequent Ultramares
case, 4 ° where the New York Court of Appeals, the same court that had decided
Glanzer, denied recovery on the ground that the potential limitlessness of
recovery was a substantial policy reason militating against the imposition of
liability, even though the class of persons injured was foreseeable. The court
reasoned that if recovery were allowed, many professions would be inhibited
and their respective existences endangered. Glanzer was distinguished on the
basis that the certificate in that case had the plaintiff's reliance as its very aim
and purpose, whereas in Ultramares the balance sheet was primarily for the
benefit of the company audited, and only incidentally for the benefit of its
creditors and investors. Moreover, in Glanzer, liability was limited in both
amount and number of potential complainants.
The Ultramares decision has been criticized on several grounds. First, the
social utility rationale put forward for the rule was considered weak and im-
practical. The court's statement that accounting and other related professions
would be unable to sustain the huge burdens of liability was dismissed as
37 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). In MacPherson, the New York Court of
Appeals held the defendant car manufacturer, who negligently failed to inspect a defective
wheel, liable in tort for personal injuries. The plaintiff had not purchased from the de-
fendant but rather from the defendant's vendee, a retail seller of automobiles. The court
reasoned that the risk of injury if the car were negligently made or inspected was fore-
seeable, or probable, as to the plaintiff, and not to the retailer-vendee. Because of the
probability of injury to prospective users, the law imposes an affirmative duty of care on
the defendant manufacturer as to members of that class. This duty is different in both
origin and scope from the defendant's voluntarily assumed contractual duties and is in
no way limited by privity of contract.
38 233 N.Y. at 239-40, 135 N.E. at 276.
39
 E.g., 21 Mich. L. Rev. 200, 203 (1922).
40 In Ultramares, it will be recalled, the defendant accountants were employed by
the Stern Co. to perform the yearly audit of that company's books. The defendants
negligently overvalued the company's assets in the balance sheet upon which the plain-
tiffs, creditors of the company, subsequently relied. When the company failed, the plain-
tiffs sought recovery of the loans made to the company, alleging that the defendants'
negligent misrepresentation of the company's financial status had induced them to make
the loan.
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factually erroneous 4 1 It was argued that the professions could insure and pass
the cost of premiums on to their clients." Secondly, the attempt to distinguish
Glanzer was rejected as semantic." Realistically, a balance sheet is prepared
at least as much for the creditors and investors of a business as it is for the
business itself. The creditor-plaintiff was as much the foreseeable beneficiary
of the defendants' certification of financial status in Ultramares as the buyer-
plaintiff was the foreseeable beneficiary of the defendant's weight certification
in Glanzer. Finally, the facts of the case did not support the court's application
of its rule. The defendants prepared precisely 32 copies of the balance sheet to
be given to Stern. The defendants knew that Stern would use these to obtain
credit. The court might well have decided that the class of prospective plain-
tiffs was not limitless but clearly limited."
The most unfortunate aspect of Ultramares was not, however, its ra-
tionale, rule, or result, but rather its subsequent treatment. 45
 The misunder-
standing of Ultramares by subsequent courts is nowhere more evident than in
a 1951 English Court of Appeals case, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co."
There, the plaintiff responded to a one-man company's solicitation for capital
and requested that he be supplied with a current balance sheet so that he
might assess the company's worth before investing £2000. The defendant
accountants prepared the balance sheet and personally put it before the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff immediately thereafter invested £2000 in the company. The
accountants had negligently failed to check certain assets, and the company
was in fact close to bankruptcy. When the company failed, the plaintiff sought
to recover his original investment from the accountants. The Court of Appeals
refused recovery, relying on Derry v. Peek ." and Le Lievre v. Gould48 for the
proposition that an action in deceit for economic loss resulting from negligent
misrepresentation does not lie when the complainant is not in privity with the
misrepresenter. The court relied on Ultramares for the further proposition
that even if a third person might recover for negligent misrepresentation, he
might not so recover from an accountant, since the losses suffered would be
economic and thus potentially limitless." In a very strong dissent, Lord
Denning made the following arguments: (1) the risk theory should be as
applicable to cases of economic loss as to cases of property damage or personal
injury; (2) the plaintiff's loss of his investment was a most probable event
if the defendants should negligently misrepresent the company's value; (3)
the plaintiff was not merely a foreseeable person to the defendants but rather
he was actually foreseen, in that the balance sheet was prepared for the very
41 See Meek, supra note 27, at 388-89.
42 See Note, supra note 27, at 327-28.
E.g., Levitin, supra note 27, at 445; Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law
of Torts, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 372, 400 {1939).
44 Sec Levitin, supra note 27, at 445.
45 See, e.g., Duro Sportswear, Inc. v, Cogen, 13 1 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1954), aff'd mem.,
285 App. Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d (1955) (dictum) ; O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50,
53 (2d Cir. 1937).
4E; [19511 2 K.B. 164 (C.A.).
47 14 App. Cas. 377 (1889).
48 118931 1 Q.B. 491 (CA.).
49 [19511 2 K.B. at 202-07.
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aim and purpose of influencing his conduct. In an article discussing the case,
Professor Seavey agreed with Lord Denning and argued that the mainspring of
Ultra mares was economic policy, and that this mainspring was absent in
Candler. He pointed out that Glanzer should more appropriately have been
used by the court, since the plaintiff in Candler was actually foreseen, in-
tended to be influenced, and the potential class of plaintiffs was numerically
limited, precisely as in Glanzer."
It should be noted that although Lord Denning argued strenuously for
the extension of the accountants' duty of care to persons not in privity of
contract, he did not argue for a broad extension of liability:
Secondly, to whom do these professional people owe this duty?
I will take accountants, but the same reasoning applies to the others.
They owe the duty, of course, to their employer or client; and also I
think to any third person to whom they themselves show the ac-
counts, or to whom they know their employer is going to show the
accounts, so as to induce him to invest money or take some other
action on them. But I do not think the duty can be extended still
further so as to include strangers of whom they have heard nothing
and to whom their employer without their knowledge may choose
to show their accounts. .. .
Thirdly, to what transactions does the duty of care extend? It
extends, I think, only to those transactions for which the accountants
knew their accounts were required.5 '
This position is very similar to that taken by the American Law Institute in
the Restatement of Torts, section 552. That section states:
One who in the course of his business or profession supplies in-
formation for the guidance of others in their business transactions is
subject to liability for harm caused to them by their reliance upon
the information if
(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtain-
ing and communicating the information which its re-
cipient is justified in expecting, and
(b) the harm is suffered
(i) by the person or one of the class of persons for
whose guidance the information was supplied,
and
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a
transaction in which it was intended to influence
his conduct or in a transaction substantially
identical therewith.
As applied to accountants, section 552 would, apparently, extend the duty of
care only to those persons or classes and for those transactions for whom and
for which the accountant actually knows he is preparing the balance sheet.
ao Seavey, supra note 32.
ai [1951] 2 K.B. at 180-82,
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Although this section has not been applied to an accounting case, it has
been used and approved in analogous areas. For example, in Hawkins v.
Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 52 the defendant title-searchers were held
not liable in negligence to the plaintiff purchasers of certain property, even
though the purchasers had relied on the title-searCh which contained a mis-
representation made through the defendants' carelessness. Since the defen-
dants' title-search had been performed ten years before the purchase of the
property by the plaintiffs and for the benefit of the plaintiffs' vendors, the
then purchasers of the property, and not for the benefit of the plaintiffs, it was
clear to the court that the Restatement rule did not allow recovery. Likewise,
Lord Pearce in the 1963 House of Lords case, Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller
Partners, 53
 utilized the Restatement rule to support his argument that
bankers who negligently misrepresented a company's credit standing to a trade
creditor, who had requested of the bankers that company's rating, should be
liable in negligence since they knew the creditor would rely on the rating. On
the other hand, at least one court has thought the Restatement to mean that a
negligent misrepresenter is liable to all reasonably foreseeable persons who rely
on his misrepresentation and are injured thereby. In Texas Tunneling Co. v.
Chattanooga,54 an engineering firm was held liable for the negligent misrepre-
sentation of construction data relied upon by the plaintiff, a subcontractor
hired by the city for which the data was prepared. The federal district court
interpreted Ultramares as requiring the foreknowledge of one specific person's
reliance before recovery could be extended to the limits of foreseeability. While
this limitation of liability is not the holding of Ultramares, it is a reasonable
elaboration if Ultramares is read alongside Glanzer. 55 The Texas Tunneling
court next contrasted this limitation with Restatement section 552, which it
read as extending liability to all foreseeable classes of persons. It is submitted,
however, that the Restatement rule does not provide for liability to the full
extent of foreseeability but only to those persons or classes of whom the
representer in fact has knowledge, and whom he intends to influence. Comment
(a), following section 552, suggests such a limitation:
As in the case of fraudulent misrepresentations the liability is con-
fined to those who are intended to rely upon the information and
who rely upon it in a type of transaction in which it is the maker's
purpose to influence their conduct. This distinction does not come
from the fact that the matter supplied is information rather than a
tangible thing. It comes from the fact that it is supplied for guidance
in a business transaction and not for guidance in a matter in which
the safety of persons, lands, or chattels is involved.
52
 165 CaI. App. 2d 116, 331 P.2d 742 (1958).
63 [19641 A.C. 465, 539. See generally Stevens, Hedley Byrne v. Heller: Judicial
Creativity and Doctrinal Possibility, 27 Modern L. Rev. 121 (1964).
64 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), rev'd, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964).
55 The holding of Ultramares was that an injured reliant party, even though fore-
seeable, could not recover against an accountant in negligence, since the economic burdens
on accountants would be too great. It is true, however, that in Ultramares the injured
parties were numerous, while in Glanzer the injured party was one company. It is this
distinction between the two cases which justifies the Texas Tunneling court's reasoning.
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The background of the Restatement rule is likewise suggestive of this limita-
tion. Apparently, the case-law basis for the Restatement rule was Glanzer and
Ultramares. 56
 In Glanzer, the plaintiff was actually foreseen and recovery was
granted, while in Ultramares, the plaintiff was foreseeable and recovery was
refused. Unless, then, the Restatement is to be treated as a code and not as an
exposition of present law," it is clear that it extends liability only to those
actually foreseen .58
Although the Restatement does not extend the duty of care to reasonably
foreseeable potential plaintiffs, there is a great deal of disagreement as to
whether the duty should be so extended. The most strenuous argument against
the foreseeability extension is that society's interest in its professions requires
that the risk of loss be thrown onto the foreseeable but actually unforeseen
injured party. The classical hypothetical posed as a rhetorical question to
support this argument is whether a cartographer who maps out an island area
but who negligently fails to include one subsurface area of reef shall be liable
in damages for all harm resulting when the Queen Mary sinks because her
captain relied on the cartographer's map. 59 The thrust of this argument is that
if cartographers were exposed to such risks, society would have no cartogra-
phers. Nor is the answer acceptable that cartographers can insure. Premiums
would probably be prohibitive to protect against such a vast potential loss.
Moreover, to say that cartographers can insure, and so there should be
liability, is really to assume the very question asked, namely whether social
interests dictate that the Queen Mary or the cartographer be burdened with
protecting against the risk of loss. Perhaps the best response to the cartogra-
pher hypothetical is to take the pragmatically tenuous position that the
cartographer should be liable to all those persons whom he should have fore-
seen would be injured as a result of his negligence. Since he performs a task
which, if carried out negligently, will result in multiple loss of life, it may be
the wiser course to impose such liability upon him in order to assure his
utmost skill. Additionally, the cartographer hypothetical may be distinguish-
able from the accountant's case with respect to reliance. Because the expert
mariner may have knowledge roughly equal to the cartographer's, his reliance
may not be too great. Thus, the limited justifiability of reliance in the car-
58 See Levitin, supra note 27, at 446 & n.42.
57 A code states what. a particular rule of law ought to be. A restatement states
what it is. Thus, the formulation of a restatement rule of law will be based on case-law
precedent. See H. M. Hart & A. M. Sachs, The Legal Process 757-61 (tent. ed. 1958).
58 Rouse, supra note 12, at 68. Analysis of the Restatement section 552 does, how-
ever, allow the interpretation that the section extends the accountant's liability to the
limits of foreseeability. That section states that liability extends to the "„ . class of
persons for whose guidance the information was supplied." Insofar as the class of
potential investors and lenders are as apt to be reading accountants' statements as are
the accountants' clients, the accountants should foresee, as a practical matter, that
the information is being supplied for the guidance of that class. Additionally, the fact
that businesses are often required under the securities legislation to have audits made
and to have the results certified and made available to the public suggests that accoun-
tants must always know that their certified statements are supplied for the guidance of
the investing and lending public.
roo This hypothetical was utilized by the majority in Candler v. Crane, Christmas
& Co., 119511 2 K.B. at 194-95; it was distinguished in the dissenting opinion of Denning,
Li., id. at 183.
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tographer situation may preclude recovery. On the other hand, the heavy
reliance of the investing public on the certifications of accountants, and the
extreme vulnerability of that public if the accountant is negligent, both
seem to favor burdening the accountant with losses resulting from his negli-
gence. Moreover, unlike the cartographer, the accountant is capable, practi-
cally speaking, of protecting against the risk of loss. He will not be driven out
of business; he can pass the cost of insurance off to his clients without raising
his fees too much.
Several other arguments favor extended liability for the accountant. First,
there appears to be no sound reason for treating economic losses resulting
from negligent misrepresentation any differently than personal injury or prop-
erty damage resulting from negligence. In general, all foreseeable losses due to
negligence should be compensated, unless some strong policy reason requires
otherwise. Second, there is a very strong background in the common law that
the party at fault compensate for the results of his fault. Third, there is no
reason why accountants should be treated differently than any other profes-
sion. Generally, the extent of professional liability for negligence is measured
by foreseeability. Simply because the effect of an accountant's negligence is
only economic loss, he should not be entitled to a favored position. Finally,
one effect of extending liability to foreseeable third persons may be to elevate
the cautionary techniques of the accounting profession and thus to prevent
future fraud and negligence. While no existing case sets forth a rule of law
extending liability to the limits of foreseeability, it is submitted that there is a
modern tendency, initiated in the law reviews and treated by some few courts,
toward expanding the liability of negligent misrepresenters. Exactly how far
this expansion will go and whether it will be applied to accountants remains to
be seen.
The following conclusions may fairly be drawn with respect to the present
state and tendency of the law of negligent misrepresentation in relation to an
accountant's liabilities to third persons. First, that privity of contract may,
but should not be a defense for an accountant when the plaintiff is injured by
the accountant's negligent misrepresentation of the financial status of his
client. Second, that the Restatement section 552 applies to accountants, so
that when an accountant knows that a limited class of persons will rely on the
balance sheet of his client, and if he should negligently misrepresent causing
economic loss to some member of that class, the accountant is liable to that
person. Finally, that there are strong theoretical grounds, not yet embodied
in the cases but proposed in the law reviews, for extending an accountant's
liability for negligent misrepresentation to all foreseeable persons who rely on
the misrepresentation and are injured thereby.
C. Fischer v. Kletz: The Duty to Disclose After-Acquired Facts
In Fischer v. Kletz, it will be recalled, the defendant accountants did
not, upon subsequent discovery, disclose to the investing and lending public
their misrepresentation of their client's assets in an already circulated balance
sheet. One issue raised for the district court was whether an accountant is
obliged under the common law to disclose to potential reliant parties facts
existing at the time of the accountant's audit of the company but undiscovered
149
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
until some time after the accountant's issuance of his certified statement. The
court decided that accountants are so obliged.
The court noted that there is no directly relevant case law determinative
of the issue presented, and therefore borrowed from several related areas of
the law. Analogies were first drawn from duty of disclosure cases which arose
in the context of sales of goods. Citing Prosser, 6° and relying additionally on
the related Restatement of Torts, section 551(2) (b)," the court stated that,
"one who has made a statement, and subsequently acquires new information
which makes it untrue or misleading, must disclose such information to any
one whom he knows to be still acting on the basis of the original statement." 62
While this rule is literally applicable to the Kletz case, it should be noted that
it derived from and is intended to apply only to nondisclosures in the case of
a sale of goods. The importance of the rule, however, lies in its rationale that
harm is very probably going to occur unless the party with the knowledge
speaks. In this regard, another case which dealt with the imposition of the duty
to warn is relevant. In Ward v. Morehead City Sea Food Co., 63 the defendant
supplier of fish was held liable in negligence to the estate of a purchaser of
fish who died as a result of poison in the fish sold by the defendant to his
retailer, who in turn sold to the purchaser. The court held inter alia that the
defendant's knowledge of the poison, acquired after the fish had been trans-
ferred to the purchaser, his knowledge of the probability of harm from the
poison, and the fact that he was the original seller, imposed a duty to warn by
means reasonable under the circumstances. Since the defendant's attempt to
warn by way of letters to retailers was held unreasonable, the duty to warn
was breached, and the plaintiff was held liable. Analogizing to the Kletz case,
it can be argued that the defendant accountant's knowledge of the misrepre-
sentation, his consequent realization of the probability of financial harm, and
the fact that he originally performed the service impose a duty to disclose. A
significant additional factor present in Ward was that the original conduct of
the defendant was negligent, so that in effect the duty imposed was a duty to
correct a previous legally recognizable error. In Kietz, however, the original
60 Prosser § 101, at 711.
61 Restatement of Torts § 551 (1938) states:
(1) One who fails to disclose to another a thing which he knows may
justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transac-
tion is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had represented
the nonexistence of the matter which he has failed to disclose, if, but only if,
he is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the
matter in question.
(2) One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reason-
able care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated.. .
(b) any subsequently acquired information which he recognizes as making
untrue or misleading a previous representation which when made was true
or believed to he so. . . .
62
 266 F. Supp. at 185. This statement was derived from an English case, With v.
O'Flanagan, [1936] 1 Ch. 575 (A.C.). In that case, the plaintiff purchasers sought rescis-
sion of a contract for the sale of a medical practice on the theory that the defendant
seller did not disclose the fact that between the date of the original negotiations and
the date of the actual execution of the sale the income rate of the practice had substan-
tially decreased. The court granted the relief sought.
63
 171 N.C. 33, 87 S.E. 958 (1916).
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conduct was not negligent, and thus it can be argued that no duty to
correct should be imposed.
The area of sales or purchases of stock by corporate insiders may likewise
be looked to in the search for a legal basis for the imposition of a duty to
disclose. Under the common law, two different rules govern the duty of a cor-
porate insider to disclose. Under the first rule, no duty of disclosure exists
unless there is a fiduciary relation between the person in possession of the
information and the other party to the transaction. Thus, for example, in
Goodwin v. Agassiz," the defendant directors of a mining corporation who
purchased the plaintiff's stock in the corporation without informing him of a
possible copper strike were held not liable in an action of deceit for accounting,
rescission, and lost profits. The court held that in the absence of a fiduciary
relation between director and stockholder, no duty to disclose could be im-
posed. Under the second rule, the presence of certain special circumstances im-
poses upon the party in possession of the information the obligation to divulge.
Special circumstances usually include knowledge of some impending transac-
tion which will substantially increase or decrease the value of the stock. Thus,
for example, in Strong v. Repide," the defendant director of a sugar company,
who, through a straw man, sought out the plaintiff and purchased her stock
in the company without informing her of an impending purchase of the com-
pany by the U.S. Government, was held accountable for lost profits.
It might well be argued that both the fiduciary requirement of the first
rule, and the special circumstances doctrine of the second, would lead to the
imposition of a duty of disclosure on the accounting profession. While it is
functionally impossible to classify the relationship between accountant and in-
vesting public as fiduciary, nevertheless, the heavy reliance of the public on
accountants' statements suggests that the accounting profession does occupy a
position of trust vis-à-vis investors and lenders. Such a position of trust
demands good faith, and therefore requires full disclosure of pertinent in-
formation, where it is clear that not to so disclose will be harmful to the
investing and lending public. Furthermore, the accountant's knowledge of a
mistake in the balance sheet, coupled with his awareness of potential transac-
tions involving his client's stock, might be considered "special circumstances"
warranting the imposition of a duty to disclose.
The court in Kletz next dealt with a distinction relating to the plaintiffs'
theory of common law liability. The plaintiffs made the argument, based on
cases arising out of sales transactions, that the maker of a representation is
obliged to disclose information which renders his original representation
erroneous, regardless of whether that information had been present at the time
of the representation or whether it arose from a subsequent change of circum-
stances. The court suggested the possibility that although there is a duty to
disclose subsequently acquired information arising from some external change
in circumstances, there is no authority that a duty of disclosure is operative
when the representer later acquires information which existed but was not
known at the time of the representation. The court was not troubled, however,
by the lack of authority on this narrow proposition. From the reliant party's
64 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.R. 659 (1933).
65 213 U.S. 419 {1909).
151
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
viewpoint, the court reasoned, there was really no distinction between the two
situations, since in both the balance sheet would be misleading.°° The court
might well have added that since the duty to disclose changes occurring after
the information had been circulated is the broader duty, and since there is
precedent for such a duty, a fortiori there is a duty to disclose facts existing
but undiscovered at the time of the audit."
The court also gave considerable attention to the defendants' argument
that pecuniary gain must accrue to the misrepresenter in order for him to be
liable. Relying heavily, although not exclusively, on cases in which persons
making affirmative misrepresentations (as opposed to nondisclosures) have
been held liable, even though taking no personal gain from their misrepresenta-
tions, the court eliminated pecuniary gain to the defendant as a necessary ele-
ment of the plaintiffs' action." If a person takes upon himself either con-
tractually or voluntarily the function of making official representations, then,
at the very least, he should be held to a level of reasonable care, as well as one
of honesty. If the defendants' argument were accepted, and pecuniary gain
had to be shown, the misrepresentation remedy would be limited solely to sales
cases or cases of actual collusion.
The defendants further argued that intent to deceive was a necessary
element of the plaintiffs' cause of action. The court rejected this argument as
setting up an unreasonably subjective standard which would present grave
difficulties of proof." This seems to be a cogent observation in so far as the
failure to act allows no inference as to intent. Thus, while proof of intent may
be difficult in ordinary affirmative wrong-doing cases, it is almost insuperable
in cases of nonfeasance. If the court had required a showing of intent to
deceive in nondisclosure cases, it would have put a major obstacle in the way
of the injured party.
The defendants contended finally that the imposition of a duty to disclose
after-acquired information would be unfairly burdensome to the accounting
profession. 7° The accountant performs his services on the basis of a predicted
cost, and the additional burden of circulating further information to the
investing and lending public would turn profits into losses. Moreover, the
potential expansion of the duty to disclose would be frightening. Is the obliga-
tion satisfied by the publication of facts discoverable by routine re-check, or
must the accountant carry out a detailed post-certification inspection? Is the
duty limited to facts existing but undiscovered at the time of the original
audit, or might it include facts which come into existence after the issuance of
the balance sheet? The defendants did not assert that the after-acquired facts
66
 266 F. Supp. at 185.
67 The duty to disclose changes in circumstances after the information has been
relied upon in a sales contract is very different from such a duty in the accounting
context. It should be noted that the court in no way committed itself to the imposition
on accountants of a duty to disclose changes in circumstances subsequent to the circu-
lation of the certified balance sheet.
68 266 F. Supp. at 187-88.
66 Id. at 188.
7° Id. at 188-89. See Fortune, July 1, 1966, at 88, 130. But see Wilcox, Accountant's
Responsibility for Disclosure of Events after Balance-Sheet Date, 89 J. Account. 286
(1950) .
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should not be disclosed. The thrust of their argument is that the obligation,
and therefore the cost, of such disclosure should be carried by the company
audited, and that the accountants' only obligations are to perform their con-
tracts honestly and carefully and to disclose to the company whatever knowl-
edge is discovered after certification and issuance.
While this argument of the defendants has a certain pragmatic lure, the
court rejected it, and properly so. Certainly, the additional cost could be esti-
mated and built into service charges. Indeed, one wonders just how much of an
economic burden it would be to circulate the after-acquired information.
Might not notifying the SEC, the major exchanges, the financial and invest-
ment journals, or the newspapers satisfy the requirement? Moreover, the
potential expansion of the duty could be controlled by careful judicial reason-
ing. Simply because a rule might be expanded in future cases is not reason for
refraining from imposing it in a present case which analytically demands it.
D. Conclusions
It is clear that the common law liabilities of accountants to persons other
than their clients are limited. Since strict liability has not been recognized
with respect to accountants' performance of their services, lack of either
honesty or care must be present for an injured reliant party to recover. Addi-
tionally, even if fraud or negligence is present, the scope of liability is often
limited. With respect to fraud, older cases limit recovery to those persons
whom the defendant in fact intended to influence, or at least knew would be
influenced. More recent cases extend the range of recovery to persons whom
the misrepresenter knew or should have known would rely. With respect to
negligence, recovery has for some time been limited to those persons whom
the defendant knew would rely on his statements. Only recently have there
been indications that persons whom the defendant should reasonably have
foreseen might recover. In light of these limits, the Kletz decision is creative
and innovative. Certainly, however, cases can be found or distinctions made
which would bring about an opposite result in Kletz, and it would be no
surprise for another court to reach a result differing from Kletz. Additionally,
it should be noted that Kletz does not consider the possible limits of the
liability it fashions. As in other areas of misrepresentation resulting in eco-
nomic loss to a large group of persons, courts may well pull back from exten-
sions of liability and circumscribe the injured parties' remedies. It is against
this background of common law limitations that related federal legislation
must be considered.
II. THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LEGISLATION
Until 1933, any remedy a third party might have against an accountant
for misrepresentation rested in the common law tort action for deceit." In
71 Prior to 1933, the only legislation directed solely at securities regulation were
the "Blue Sky" laws of the various states. In this comment only the federal scheme of
regulation embodied in the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1964), and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1964), will be considered.
For a general discussion of civil liability under the "Blue Sky" laws, see L. Loss & E.
Cowett, Blue Sky Laws 129-80 (1958).
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1933, Congress passed the Securities Act, 72 which established a comprehensive
scheme for regulating securities transactions. In 1934, the Securities Act was
amended," and Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act. 74 It is clear that
Congress intended, in passing this legislation, to provide the public with more
protection and better remedies than were available at common law. It is un-
clear, however, to what extent Congress expanded upon the common law. It
will be the purpose of the following sections of this comment to determine the
answers to two questions: (1) What is the scope of the duties imposed on
accountants under the securities legislation? (2) To whom do these duties
extend? These questions may be answered only by examining the legislative
purpose of the legislation and the liabilities sections of the two acts, as inter-
preted by the courts.
A. Legislative Intent
The necessity for federal legislation that would protect the investing
public from fraudulent and irresponsible securities transactions" arose from
the speculative and unorthodox financing of the 1920's and the resultant stock-
market crash of 1929. 76 There were, essentially, two methods by which such
protection could be afforded: (1) legislation which would set up a govern-
mental agency to make public judgment as to the quality of the security pro-
posed to be issued; 77 or (2) legislation which concentrated on demanding full
disclosure of relevant information in the issue of securities." Congress chose
the latter course."
In his message to Congress on March 29, 1933, President Roosevelt
stated:
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every
issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be ac-
companied by full publicity and information, and that no essentially
important element attending the issue shall be concealed from the
buying public."
The stated purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 was to "provide full and fair
72 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
73 48 Stat. 905 (1934).
74
 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
The deceptive and manipulative practices of the pre-crash period led to a Senate
investigation which "indicted a system as a whole that had failed miserably in imposing
those essential fiduciary standards that should govern persons whose function it was to
handle other people's money. Investment bankers, brokers and dealers, corporate directors,
accountants, all found themselves objects of criticism." Landis, The Legislative History
of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 29, 30 (1959).
76
 id. For a general discussion of the economic and social factors leading up to
the stock-market crash of 1929, see J. Galbraith, The Great Crash, 1929 (1955); F. L.
Allen, Only Yesterday (1931).
77
 Landis, supra note 75, at 30.
78
 See, e.g., Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23.
79
 It has been suggested that Congress was influenced and favorably impressed by
the English experience. See 1 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 128 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as Loss].
80 H.R. Rep, No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
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disclosure of the character of securities sold. . . ." 8 ' The statute recognized
that there were certain classes of persons who, because of their expertise or
position, had intimate knowledge of the securities being offered. It imposed
upon these persons a duty to disclose material information to the investing
public, and a requirement that what is disclosed be an honest representation
of the facts. 82 The act sought to enforce these duties through a scheme of
civil and criminal liabilities.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was intended to correct practices
not covered by the previous act." A basic mechanical difference should be
noted. The 1933 act has detailed provisions outlining the disclosure require-
ments and liabilities for failing to meet these requirements. The 1934 act,
however, is framed in comparatively broad terms, "deliberately left to be
amplified by the S.E.C. and the courts . . ." 84 This leaves greater discretion
to the Securities Exchange Commission to promulgate rules to effectuate the
broad legislative purpose.
It is manifest that accountants fall within the class of persons on whom
the legislative scheme intended to impose the duty to disclose. Section 6 of
the 1933 act requires that the registration statement filed with the commission
be signed, inter alia, by the "principal accounting officer." Section 11 explicitly
imposes liability on accountants in certain circumstances. As James Landis,
one of the drafters of the Securities Act of 1933, stated:
We were particularly anxious through the imposition of adequate
civil liabilities to assure the performance by corporate directors and
officers of their fiduciary obligations and to impress upon accountants
the necessity for independence and a thorough professional ap-
proach." (Emphasis added.)
That the acts expressly impose civil liability on accountants in certain
circumstances manifests a recognition of the role accountants play in securities
transactions. The financial condition of the corporation, in its registration
statements, prospectus, and annual reports, plays a vital role in the determina-
tion by the investing public of whether to buy or sell securities. The fact that
accountants are inherently involved in the formulation of these statements
necessitates that they be included in any regulation that seeks to provide full
and fair disclosure. Moreover, the public puts great weight and reliance on
the statements of accountants because of their expertise and independent
position.
It is evident that Congress intended to impose upon accountants a duty
of disclosure. When this duty is imposed, and to whom it extends, can only be
81 Securities Act of 1933, preamble, 48 Stat. 881.
82 See Landis, supra note 75, at 35.
83 Basically, the practices sought to be regulated by the 1934 act that were not
regulated in the 1933 act were market manipulations. The 1933 act was concerned
mainly with the conduct between individuals as individuals. The 1934 act was con-
cerned with the conduct of individuals in relation to the market. See Note, Civil Lia-
bility Under Section 10B and Rule 10B-5: A Suggestion For Replacing the Doctrine
of Privity,• 74 Yale L.J. 658-59 (1965).
84 Trussel v. United Underwriters Ltd., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. Si 91,373, at 94,567 (D. Colo. 1964).
85 See Landis, supra note 75, at 35.
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determined through an analysis of the judicial construction of the civil lia-
bilities sections of the acts. For clarity, the legislation will be examined in the
following order: (1) the sections in which civil liability is express; (2) the
sections in which the courts have implied civil liability.
B. Express Liabilities
1. Section 11 of the Securities Act." Section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933 imposes civil liability only for misrepresentations or omissions of ma-
80 Section 11 reads, in pertinent part:
(a) In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became
effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state
a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved
that at the time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may,
either at law or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue—
(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
.	 .	 .
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profes-
sion gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent
been named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration state-
ment, or as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used
in connection with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in
such registration statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been
prepared or certified by him;
If such person acquired the security after the issuer has made generally
available to its security holders an earning statement covering a period of at
least twelve months beginning after the effective date of the registration state-
ment, then the right of recovery under this subsection shall be conditioned on
proof that such person acquired the security relying upon such untrue statement
in the registration statement or relying upon the registration statement and not
knowing of such omission, but such reliance may be established without proof
of the reading of the registration statement by such person.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a) of this section no
person, other than the issuer, shall be liable as provided therein who shall sus-
tain the burden of proof—
(1) that before the effective date of the part of the registration statement
with respect to which his liability is asserted (A) he had resigned from or had
taken such steps as are permitted by law to resign from, or ceased or refused
to act in, every office, capacity, or relationship in which he was described in the
registration statement as acting or agreeing to act, and (B) he had advised the
Commission and the issuer in writing that he had taken such action and that
he would not be responsible for such part of the registration statement; or
(2) that if such part of the registration statement became effective without
his knowledge, upon becoming aware of such fact he forthwith acted and ad-
vised the Commission, in accordance with paragraph (1) of this subsection, and,
in addition, gave reasonable public notice that such part of the registration
statement had become effective without his knowledge; or
(3) that (A) as regards any part of the registration statement not pur-
porting to be made on the authority of an expert, and not purporting to be a
copy of or extract from a report or valuation of an expert, and not purporting
to be made on the authority of a public official document or statement, he had,
after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at
the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the state-
ments therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material
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terial facts in the registration statement filed with the commission. 87 Accoun-
tants are expressly included in the two classes of possible defendants: (1) the
issuer; 88 and (2) those persons who are significantly and publicly connected
with the registration statement." While the liability of the issuer is absolute,"
the liability of the accountant is more limited. The accountant will be liable
only for intentional or negligent misrepresentations or omissions . 91 Liability
will extend, however, as in the case of the issuer, to all persons who purchase
the security .92
The elimination, under section 11, of any requirement of scienter,
privity or reliance represents a radical departure from the common law tort of
deceit. This disturbed members of the financing industry and the section was
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading; and (B) as regards any part of the registration statement pur-
porting to be made upon his authority as an expert or purporting to be a
copy of or extract from a report or valuation of himself as an expert, (i) he
had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe,
at the time such part of the registration statement became effective, that the
statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein
not misleading, or (ii) such part of the registration statement did not fairly
represent his statement as an expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from
his report or valuation as an expert; and (C) as regards any part of the regis-
tration statement purporting to be made on the authority of an expert (other
than himself) or purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report or valu-
ation of an expert (other than himself), he bad no reasonable ground to
believe and did not believe, at the time such part of the registration statement
became effective, that the statements therein were untrue or that there was an
omission to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading, or that such part of the registration
statement did not fairly represent the statement of the expert or was not a
fair copy of or extract from the report or valuation of the expert. . . .
87 The mechanics for registration of new issues of securities is set out in §§ 5, 7
and 11 of the 1933 act. Section 5 makes it unlawful to use the mails or interstate com-
merce to sell any security not registered with the SEC. Section 7 and Schedule B set
forth the information to be filed with the Commission. Section 11 provides civil liability
for noncompliance or faulty compliance with §§ 5 and 7.
as § 11(a)(1).
89 These persons include, inter &dirt, (1) every person who signs the registration
statement; (2) directors or partners of the issuer at the time of filing; (3) every person
named in the registration statement to become a director; (4) underwriters; (5) experts
(e.g., acountants, appraisers, engineers).
99 Section 11(a) provides for a standard of absolute liability for the persons liable
under the section. Section 11(b), which provides the defenses to liability under § 11(a),
explicitly limits these defenses to persons "other than the issuer." The only defense open
to the issuer is to show that the person who purchased the stock knew at the time of
the purchase of the misstatement or omission. § 11(a).
91 The accountant is responsible only for misstatements or omissions in that part
of the registration statement attributable to him. Under § 11(b), the accountant may
insulate himself from liability by taking the following steps: (1) before the registration
statement becomes effective, he must resign from the position attributed to him in the
statement and notify the SEC; or (2) if the registration statement has become effective
without his knowledge, he must resign from the position attributed to him in the state-
ment and give reasonable public notice that such part of the registration statement
became effective without his knowledge.
92 § 11(a).
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characterized as the "bete noir [sic] which was going to stifle legitimate
financing."" It can be shown, however, that section 11 was vastly overesti-
mated as a vehicle for recoveries by the general buying public against issuers
and experts. 94
The issue of accountants' liability under section 11 has been raised
in only one case. In Shonts v. Hirliman," plaintiffs brought an action against
both the accountants and directors of the corporation in which they purchased
stock. The complaint alleged misrepresentations and omissions of material
facts in the registration statement in . relation to a rental agreement between the
issuer and another corporation. The rental agreement was entered into subse-
quent to the time of certification and the filing of the registration statement,
but prior to the date the registration statement became effective. The registra-
tion statement was amended by the issuer to disclose the rental agreement. It
failed to disclose, however, the issuer's obligation to pay a minimum annual
rental of $35,000. Although there was no evidence of the rental agreement in
the corporate books prior to the date of certification of the registration state-
ment, there was such evidence after the certification, but before the date the
registration statement became effective. Plaintiffs sought to impose liability
on the accountants on the ground that the accountants had negligently certi-
fied a registration statement that misrepresented the corporation's financial
position by understating its contingent liability.
The court held that there could be no recovery against the accountants
as there was no omission or misrepresentation of material fact at the time that
the registration statement was certified by the accountants. The court noted
that the accountants had not prepared the amendment to the registration
statement and stated:
The rental arrangement was not called to their [the accountants']
attention. There was no entry on the books at their disposal, from
which, by further inquiry, they might have discovered that there was
such an undertaking. Absent these, they cannot be charged with a
misrepresentation which was made later—long after their certifica-
tion."
It is submitted that the Shonts decision does violence to the intent and
. purpose of the securities legislation to provide for full and fair disclosure.
More significantly, it incorrectly interprets section 11 to find that an accoun-
tant's duty to follow reasonable and thorough accounting practices 47 ends with
the date of certification of the registration statement by the accountant: that
the accountant has no duty to continue his investigation after the date of
certification, and correspondingly no duty to disclose any change in corporate
position after that date. Nowhere in section 11 is the date of certification
mentioned as a guide to determine the extent of the accountant's duties.
93 3 Loss 1721.
94 Id.
95
 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
96
 Id. at 483.
97
 It has been suggested that the court in Shonts was satisfied with "surprisingly
low accounting standards." 3 Loss 1733. See generally L. Rappaport, SEC Accounting
Practice and Procedure (2d ed. 1963).
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Rather, under the language of section 11, the accountant has a defense only
if he believed, after reasonable investigation, that the statements made were
true and not misleading at the time that the registration statement became
effective. 98 This statutory language would appear to impose on accountants
a continuing duty of care beyond the date of certification, and to impose
upon them the duty to disclose changes in corporate position between the
date of certification and the date when the registration statement becomes
effective. This construction of the section comports with the obvious con-
gressional intent to ensure that the information in the registration statement,
as disseminated to the public, honestly and correctly reflects the financial
position of the corporation.
2. Section 12 of the Securities Act." Section 12(1) of the 1933 act
imposes civil liability on any person who offers or sells a security without
filing a registration statement with the commission. Liability is imposed, under
section 12(2), on one who offers or sells securities by means of a prospectus
that includes a misrepresentation of a material fact or fails to disclose a
material fact. The literal statutory language of both sections would appear
to exclude accountants from liability as liability is imposed only on one who
"offers or sells" securities; and such person is liable only to "the person
purchasing such security from him." The great weight of authority supports
this conclusion. 100
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York,
however, has interpreted section 12 so as to expand the class of possible
defendants to persons beyond technical "sellers." In Wonnemann v. Stratford
Secs. Co.,101 plaintiff bought some stock from defendant brokerage firm.
Plaintiff alleged that the stock was sold in violation of section 12(1), in that
there was no registration statement filed with the commission. Although his
order was taken by an agent of the firm, plaintiff sued both the firm and its
directors as individuals. A motion for summary judgment was made by the
98 § 11() ) (3) (B) (i).
ell Section 12 reads:
Any person who—
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of section 77e of this title, or
(2) offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the pro-
visions of section 3, other than paragraph (2) of subsection (a) of said
section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or com-
munication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus
or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material
fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and
who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omis-
sion,
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue
either at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover
the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount
of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for dam-
ages if he no longer owns the security.
100 See 3 Loss 1712-21.
tot [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 90,923 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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directors, on the ground that they, as individuals, were not the "sellers" within
the meaning of section 12, and therefore did not fall within the ambit of the
statute. The court denied the motion, stating that the defendants "must show
that they did not participate in the sale and not merely that they did not
actually sell the securities to plaintiff."1°2 The criteria, according to the court,
was not the technical status of defendant as "seller," but his participation
in the sale. The opinion did not define what constitutes "participation in the
sale," although it implied that supervisors, advertisers, directors, officers and
others could all be found to have participated in the sale.'"
tinder the Wonneniann rationale, accountants could be held to have
"participated" in a sale of stock, and hence, whenever there is a misrepre-
sentation or omission of material fact in the prospectus, to be in violation
of section 12(2).'" Liability under section 12(2) is similar to that under
section 11 in that it will be imposed for negligent as well as for intentional
misrepresentations or omissions. The inclusion of accountants in the class of
possible defendants under section 12(2) effectively places on accountants the
duty of full disclosure and reasonable care in the preparation of prospectuses,
as well as registration statements.
While the imposition of disclosure requirements on accountants in the
preparation of prospectuses as well as registration statements would comport
with the purpose of the legislation, to do so under section 12 would amount
to judicial legislation. The statutory language manifests an intent on the part
of Congress that liability, in these circumstances, be imposed only on sellers,
and that privity of contract be a requisite for suit under this section.
3. Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act.'°5 Of the three sections
of the Securities Exchange Act which expressly impose civil liability, 106 only
section 18 has any relation to accountants acting in their professional capacity.
102 Id. at 92,963.
103 Id .
1 ° 4 While Wonnemann is concerned with a § 12(1) violation, the extension of the
class of possible defendants is equally applicable to § 12(2), as the statutory language
"one who offers or sells" applies to both subsections.
105 Section 18 reads:
(a) Any person who shall make or cause to'be made any statement in any
application, report, or document filed pursuant to this title or any rule or
regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement
as provided in subsection (d) of section 15 of this title, which statement was
at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made false
or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person
(not knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance
upon such statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which
was affected by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance, unless the
person sued shall prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that
such statement was false or misleading. A person seeking to enforce such lia-
bility may sue at law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction.
In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for
the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant.
106
 §§ 9, 16(b) and 18. Section 9 imposes liability on persons responsible for certain
enumerated market manipulations. Section 16(b) imposes liability on corporate "insiders"
who acquire "short swing" profits.
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This section has been called a "very much attenuated § 11." 187 It imposes
liability on those persons who make, or cause to be made, a misleading state-
ment in any document filed with a national exchange. Such persons would
include accountants. Recovery under section 18, however, runs only to those
who buy or sell the security at a price effected by the misrepresentation or
omission in question. Moreover, the plaintiff must show reliance on the
defendant's conduct and that he (the plaintiff) did not know that the state-
ments made were false or misleading. Further, the defendant will not be
liable if he can show that he "acted in good faith and had no knowledge that
such statement was false or misleading." In effect, this defense makes only
intentional misrepresentations or omissions actionable. Thus, while section
18 extends liability to misrepresentations or omissions in any document filed
with a national exchange, it reinstates the requirements of scienter, causation
and reliance, all of which were discarded in section 11. In fact, as Professor
Louis Loss has stated in relation to section 18:
Except for avoiding any question that the person making the false
statement or causing it to be made can be sued by the buyer or
seller notwithstanding the absence of privity between them, it is
hard to see what advantage § 18 gives the investor that he does
not have in common law deceit. 108
Because of the limited scope of liability, section 18 has not been a successful
vehicle for recoveries by investors for false or misleading statements in docu-
ments filed with a national exchange.
C. Implied Civil Liabilities
In addition to the civil liabilities which are expressly provided for in
the 1933 and 1934 acts, the courts have found other liabilities to be implied
in the legislation. The basic source of these implied liabilities is found in
rule 10b-5, 108 promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission under
section 10b of the 1934 act. Because of the general wording of the section
and rule, and the broad interpretation of the rule given by the courts, the
liabilities imposed under rule 10b-5 are broad and fill, to some extent, the
gaps left by the express civil _liabilities sections. Although, as a general rule,
the express liabilities sections have been poor vehicles for recoveries by
investors, rule IOb-5 has been a potent weapon for effectuating the purpose
of the legislation and enforcing the duty of disclosure. The determination
of the outer limits of the duty of accountants to make full and fair disclosure,
therefore, can only be made by looking to rule 106-5.
1. Rule 10b-5. Section 10b of the 1934 act prohibits the use of manip-
ulative or deceptive devices in the purchase or sale of any security. It
authorizes the SEC to formulate rules and regulations to enforce this
proscription. Rule 10b-5, promulgated in 1942, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
107 3 Loss 1751.
108 Id. at 1752.
I" 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1964).
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of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
Neither the rule nor section 10b expressly state that civil liability is to be
imposed on those who violate the rule. The courts, nevertheless, have con-
sistently implied a civil remedy."° The United States Supreme Court, how-
ever, has yet to hear a lob-5 case and, until it does, the issue cannot be
considered closed.
While the courts which have considered the question are consistent in
implying a civil remedy, they vary in their interpretation of what elements
are necessary to maintain a cause of action under the rule. An early case ]."
held that a "semblance of privity" was a requisite to a cause of action. Yet,
the great weight of authority has rejected the necessity of privity," finding
that liability does not depend upon the defendant's status as a "buyer" or
"seller" but rather upon his connection with the sale. The elimination of the
requirement of privity would clearly put accountants within the ambit of
the ruIe.112
In H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 114 a United States district court held
that accountants could have a sufficient connection with a purchase or sale
of securities to make them potential defendants under the rule. Plaintiff
purchased stock, relying on a financial statement issued by defendant ac-
countants. 115 Plaintiff alleged that the accountants knowingly prepared the
statements to misrepresent the financial status of the corporation. The de-
fendants moved to dismiss the suit, claiming that they were not liable under
110 Civil liability under the rule was first implied in Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED. Pa. 1946). For a comprehensive listing of cases brought
under rule 10b-5, see Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of
Legislative Intent? 57 Nw. L. Rev. 627, 687-90 (1963).
111 Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y.
1951), aff'd per curiam, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). Accord, Heit v. Weitzen, [1964-
1966 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. II 91,701 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (semble).
112
 See 3 Loss 1767.
113 In a case decided under § 17 of the 1933 act, almost identical with rule 10b-5,
accountants were held to be within the ambit of the section. United States v. White,
124 F.2d 181 (2d Or. 1941). It should be noted that some courts have been willing to
imply civil liability in § 17 of the 1933 act. Osborn v. Mallory, 86 F. Supp. 869, 879
(S.D.N.Y. 1949). It has been suggested, however, that the implication of civil liability
under § 17 poses great conceptual difficulties. See 3 Loss 1790. Because of the near iden-
tity of the language of § 17 and rule 10b-5, there is no separate discussion of civil
liability under § 17.
114 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
115
 The transaction involved a merger of two corporations. The court held, however,
that the stock acquisition constituted a "purchase" within the meaning of rule 10b-5.
Id. at 96.
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10b-5, as they were not the sellers. The court held the complaint sufficient,
stating:
The complaint alleges that these defendants [accountants] know-
ingly did acts pursuant to a conspiracy to defraud. Their status as
accountants and the fact that their activities were confined to the
preparation of false and misleading financial statements and repre-
sentations does not immunize these defendants from civil suit for
their alleged participation. 116
Although in Green it was alleged that the conduct of the accountants
was intentional, courts have faced the question whether liability can be
imposed under rule 10b-5 for negligent, as well as for intentional, conduct.
This question has divided the courts. Early in the development of a civil
remedy under the rule, the Second Circuit, in Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg.
Co.,117 held that it was necessary to allege and prove "fraud" in order to
maintain a suit under the rule.'" The court did not define what it meant by
"fraud." Subsequently, a district court in the circuit read Fischman to re-
quire intentional conduct for a lOb-5 violation. 119
While the Second Circuit has held that intent is a requisite element of
a suit under the rule, the Ninth Circuit has rejected this interpretation and
has found lOb-5 to be directed at negligent as well as at intentional mis-
representations and omissions. 12° While 10b-5 has been characterized as an
"anti-fraud" rule, 121 the rule, and section I0b, are written in broad terms:
The phrasing of the section and the omission of any specific language
requiring "intention" or "willfulness" suggests that conduct may be
"manipulative" or "deceptive" within the meaning of the section
without being intentional.122
Subsection (3) of the rule prohibits "any act, practice, or course of business
which would operate as a fraud or deceit." From the wording, it would appear
that this subsection is concerned with conduct and the result of the conduct,
not the state of the actor's mind (intent). As such, negligent conduct which
would tend to mislead, deceive or defraud would be violative of the rule.
It is submitted, therefore, that the inclusion of negligent, as well as inten-
tional, conduct within the ambit of 10b-5 liability would best effectuate the
110 Id.
117 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
119 Id. at 786-87.
119 Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The Second Circuit
has traditionally been one of the most conservative circuits in defining liability under
the rule. It has delimited liability by both a privity and scienter requirement. Both these
requirements seem to have been repeated in a rather confused decision in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Heit v. Weitzen, [1964-1966
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. lf 91,701 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
129 Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). The Seventh Circuit has also held
rule 10b-5 to apply to negligent conduct. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th
Cir. 1963), aff'g 208 F. Supp. 803, 823 (ED. Wis. 1962). For a general discussion
of negligent conduct under rule 10b-5, see Note, supra note 83, at 682-90.
121 See Note, supra note 83, at 683.
122 Id.
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legislative purpose of providing the public with complete and accurate in-
formation. This purpose is to be achieved through the imposition of the duty
to disclose. To impose such a duty without also imposing a corresponding
duty of care in the act of disclosing would conflict with that ultimate legis-
lative purpose.
The interpretation of subsection (3) of the rule to imply an affirmative
duty of disclosure is the most significant departure from the common law
that the courts have made in this field. At common law, as has been noted,
an action in deceit would lie for both misrepresentations and half-truths. In
the absence of special facts, a fiduciary relationship or an executory contract
of sale, the common law imposed no duty to disclose material facts known
by one party but not the other. While the law was concerned with the truth-
fulness of what was said, complete silence was not objectionable. In deter-
mining what conduct would operate as a fraud or deceit under subsection
(3), the courts have not felt constrained by traditional common law con-
cepts. 123
 In Trussel v. United Underwriters, 124 it was stated:
We do not assume that offenses against these provisions [subsections
(1) and (3)1 are, by any means, identical with common law deceit.
The definition of "fraud" .. . in securities statutes is very much
attenuated. 125
As the court interpreted subsection (3), a duty of disclosure is imposed on
persons who would not have that duty under the common law:
We have no doubt but that "manipulative or deceptive device
or fraud" includes various types of fraud which would not always
be cognizable as common law deceit, e.g., a "fraud" based wholly
on a failure to speak in a non-fiduciary situation. 126
in addition, the imposition of a duty to disclose clearly operates to effectuate
the legislative purpose:
This congressional concern with placing responsibility on the party
having the greater access to material information has been acknowl-
edged in cases involving complete non-disclosure under 10b-5 (3).
Liability in such cases is based on a breach of duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff—the duty to disclose. Although this
obligation has been characterized as "fiduciary" or "quasi-fiduciary,"
the duty to disclose under 10b-5 (3) does not depend upon the tra-
ditionally delineated relationship. Rather, the obligation can arise
in isolated sales transactions between total strangers, linked only
as buyer and seller. The primary factor which gives rise to the duty
is the unequal access to material information. 127
125
 See, e.g., The Prospects for Rule X-10B-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded
Investors, 59 Yale L.J. 1120 (1950).
124
 Trussel v. United Underwriters Ltd., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. f 91,373 (D. Colo. 1964).
125
 Id. at 94,567.
120
 Id. at 94,569.
127
 Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 101)-5, 32 U. Chi. L. Rev.
824, 840-41 (1965).
164
STUDENT COMMENT
The affirmative duty to disclose extends primarily to corporate "insiders"
—those persons who, because of their position, have access to facts not avail-
able to the general public.128 Accountants would seem clearly within this
class of persons. Their unique position gives them access to the most inti-
mate financial details of the corporation—details particularly relevant to the
determination of whether to buy or sell securities. The accountant's certifi-
cation, moreover, is intended to influence the investing public.' Inherent
in the concept of an independent public accountant's certification is the
assumption that the result will be an objective and professional evaluation
of the financial condition of the corporation. It is manifest, therefore, that
one reason for having an audit by an independent accountant rather than
a company auditor is that the investing public is more likely to accept, and
hence be influenced by, the accountant's evaluation. Thus, the duty to fully
and accurately disclose all relevant information must be imposed upon
accountants, in order to completely effectuate the legislative purpose.
2. Fischer v. Kletz—A Suggested Approach. While it seems clear that
a duty to disclose is imposed on accountants under 10b-5, it must still be
determined in what circumstances that duty will be invoked. This issue
breaks down into two basic questions: (1) What facts is an accountant re-
quired to disclose? (2) At what point in time will the accountant be relieved
of this duty? The first of these two questions is relatively easy to answer.
The nature of an accountant's audit is to represent the financial condition
of the corporation. It is manifest, therefore, that the accountant must disclose
all financial data necessary for an accurate determination of the corporation's
financial condition. Moreover, it is recognized by the accounting profession
that the ultimate purpose of the annual audit is to represent the potential
earning power of the corporation. 13° Thus, factors which would not ordinarily
be reflected on the balance sheet but which are relevant to the earning power
of the corporation should also be disclosed. Such "non-accounting" factors
would include labor conditions, market conditions, management expertise,
etc. 13 ' Under general accounting principles it is recognized that disclosure
of these "non-accounting" factors is necessary in certain circumstances. Thus,
it has been suggested that it would be incumbent upon an accountant to
disclose a major change in market conditions so that the certified balance
sheets accurately reflect the corporate earning potential. 132
On the other hand, where the accountant is in no position to make an
authoritative judgment on certain factors, there should be no duty on him
to disclose.laa For example, the death of a corporate officer is a "non-account-
ing" factor which could reflect on the corporate earning potential; but it
128 Section 16(a) of the 1934 act specifically imposes a duty on "insiders" to disclose
all trading. Liability is imposed for "short swing" profits under § 16(b).
128 It should be noted' that public accountants are being reimbursed for their re-
sponsibility to be accurate and nonnegligent. This should impose upon them a higher
standard of care. See Note, supra note 84, at 686.
130 See Wilcox, Accountant's Responsibility for Disclosure of Events After the Bal-
ance-Sheet Date, 89 J. Account. 286, 290 (1950).
131 For a general discussion of generally accepted accounting practice and the duty
to disclose, see id. at 288.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 293.
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is a fact which the accountant should not be required to disclose, as he lacks
the professional capability to judge its effect on earning potential.
The fixing of a point in time at which the accountant will be relieved
of his continuing duty to disclose presents a more difficult question. It is
this precise question that is raised in Fischer v. Kletz 1 34 In the Kletz case,
it will be recalled, defendant accountants certified a financial statement which
reflected a substantial net income for the fiscal period in question, while,
in fact, there had been a substantial loss. Subsequent to this certification
and the dissemination of this information to investors in the corporation's
annual report,"5 the accountants became aware of the true financial status
of the corporation. The accountants notified the corporation of the error but
failed to make any attempt at public disclosure of the misleading nature of
the annual report. Plaintiffs bought stock and debentures in the corporation
relying on the annual report. Shortly thereafter the corporation went into
bankruptcy, and plaintiffs sued defendant accountants alleging that the de-
fendants had violated a duty to publicly disclose the error in the annual re-
port and that their failure to so disclose constituted a course of business
which operated as a fraud, in violation of Section 18 of the Securities Ex-
change Act and rule 10b-5.
Defendants PMM moved to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. In a lengthy opinion, the district court dismissed the
defendants' motion, both as to section 18 and rule 10b-5, holding that under
certain facts, defendant accountants could be liable to the plaintiffs.
In a rather cursory treatment of section 18 liability, the court noted
that there was a factual disagreement between the parties as to whether
defendants PMM had knowledge of the falsity of the financial statements
prior to the filing of the statements with the Securities Exchange Commission.
Consequently, the judge deemed it advisable "to defer resolution of the issue
of PMM's Section 18 liability until the facts are more fully developed." 133
The discussion of rule 10b-5 liability was more extensive. The court was
concerned with two major questions: (1) Whether there could be liability
under 10b-5 if it appeared that the defendant "did not directly gain from
its failure to disclose the discovery of the falsity of the financial state-
ments ; "187 and (2) whether privity was necessary for plaintiff to recover. In
10b-5 actions privity has been a consistently difficult concept for the courts
in the Second Circuit.138
In analyzing the first question, the court noted that several cases have
found liability under 10b-5 without any finding of direct financial gain to the
defendant in question. In H.L. Green Co. v. Childree,'3° it was held that ac-
countants could be liable for false information disseminated to the public in
134 28 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
135
 The same certified financial statements had been filed with the Securities Ex-
change Commission in a Form 10-K Report.
133 266 F. Supp. at 189.
137 Id. at 190.
138 See note 119 supra.
133
 185 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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certified financial statements, although the accountants realized no direct fi-
nancial benefit from the purchase or sale of the security. In Pettit v. American
Stock Exch., 140
 it was held that the stock exchange could be liable under rule
10b-5 for failing to take disciplinary action against practices which were
violative of the federal securities regulations when the exchange had knowl-
edge of the abusive practices. In neither of these cases was the court troubled
by the fact that the defendant in question realized no direct financial gain
from the alleged breach of duty. In Kletz, however, the court failed to reach
a final resolution of the problem. It characterized the issue as "novel and
difficult" and preferred to defer final resolution of the problem until there
was "further factual and legal development of it by the parties and the
SEC."141
It is surprising that the Kletz court raised this question at all. Nowhere
in rule 10b-5 is there any intimation that to be liable a defendant must
realize some financial gain from his breach of duty. That interpretation would
assume a restitutional theory of liability under rule 10b-5 similar to that of
Section 1 6 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act.' 42 Such a theory would appear
to contradict the purpose of the securities legislation and its interpretation
by the courts. The primary purpose of the federal scheme of securities regu-
lation is to ensure that the public receive full and accurate information re-
garding securities issued. This purpose would not be effectuated by limiting
the duty to disclose full and accurate information to those persons who have
a financial interest in the transaction. Moreover, the language of the rule
delimits the duty to disclose in different terms: the duty is imposed on all
persons who have a connection with the transaction. It is submitted, there-
fore, that this consideration has no basis in determining liability under rule
10b-5.
In considering the second question—privity—the court found that there
was no privity or even a semblance of privity between the plaintiffs and the
defendants PMM.' 43 Although noting that previous decisions in the Second
Circuit had made privity a requisite to recovery under the rule, the court
refused to dismiss the complaint for lack of privity. 144 Instead, the court
preferred to test the validity of the complaint upon the determination of
whether the accountants had any connection with the transaction. 145 Again,
however, the court deferred resolution of this issue "in view of the inadvanced
state of discovery in our case."'" It is submitted that the court easily could
have found the requisite connection between PMM and the transaction.
As discussed above,147 while the issue has never been fully litigated, several
courts have had little difficulty in finding a connection between accountants
and the sale of securities in similar situations. It is clear that there can be
140 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
141 266 F. Supp. at 194.
142 Under Section 160) of the Securities Exchange Act, a corporation may recover
short swing profits made by an insider on the corporation's securities.
148 266 F. Supp. at 192.
144 Id. at 192-93.
141 Id. at 193.
146 Id .
147 Supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
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no broad decisional or statutory definition of the requisite connection, and
that each case must be decided on its merits. The fact that PMM certified
statements for dissemination to the public which would surely be influenced
in purchasing the corporation's securities should be enough to establish the
necessary connection with the transaction. This conclusion is reinforced by
the fact that the accounting profession recognizes that part of their function
is to represent the earning potential of the corporation, and that these repre-
sentations will be used to influence the investing public.
Nowhere in the Kletz opinion does the court come to grips with the
question whether rule 10b-5 requires disclosure of facts acquired after the
certification and distribution of financial statements. It is impossible to
determine whether the omission of any discussion of this question resulted
from a failure of the court to recognize that this was, in fact, a question;
or whether the court merely assumed that such a duty was imposed under
the rule. It is submitted that while such a duty to disclose should be imposed
under the rule, this duty is not obvious, and warrants discussion. The re-
mainder of this comment will suggest an approach to finding a duty to dis-
close after-acquired facts under rule 10b-5.
In any discussion of an accountant's duty to disclose, there are three
dates which must be distinguished:
(1) The Balance-Sheet Date—This is the date which ends the fiscal
period for which the audit is being made. Thus, if an audit is being made
for the fiscal year extending from June 1, 1966, through May 31, 1967, the
balance-sheet date is May 31, 1967.
(2) The Date of Certification—This is the date on which the accountant
certifies the audit. The date of certification may be significantly later than
the balance-sheet date. Thus, an audit for the fiscal year ending May 31,
1967, may be certified on September I, 1967.
(3) The Date of Distribution—This is the date on which the prospectus,
annual report, statement, etc., in which the accountant's audit is incorpo-
rated, is distributed to the public. Thus, an audit for the fiscal year ending
May 31, 1967, certified- on September 1, 1967, may be distributed on October
1, 1967.
It is clear that the nature of an audit necessitates the disclosure of all
relevant facts up through the balance-sheet date. It is equally clear that facts
of which the accountant becomes aware after the balance-sheet date but
before the date of certification must also be disclosed. For example, if there
is a change in market conditions between the balance-sheet date and the date
of certification, the accountant is required to disclose this change. This is
because the ultimate purpose of the audit is not merely to restate the cor-
porations financial position for the preceding year, but to represent the
potential earning power of the corporation for the future. Although the change
in the market will not make the audit misrepresentative of the previous fiscal
period, it will make the audit misrepresentative of the corporation's earning
potential. 148
It would also appear that facts which come to the attention of the
148 Wilcox, supra note 130, at 292.
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accountant after the date of certification but before the date of distribution
should be disclosed. In this regard, it may be helpful to recall some of the
duties imposed on accountants under section 11 of the 1933 act. Under sec-
tion 11, the accountant must follow reasonable and thorough accounting
procedures beyond the date of certification and up to the date when the
registration statement becomes effective.149 The accountant is charged with
the duty to disclose changes in corporate position between these dates to the
SEC. It is not hard to analogize between the duties imposed by section 11
of the 1933 act and rule 10b-5. It would seem inconsistent, to say the least,
that the effectuation of the legislative purpose of full and fair disclosure
necessitated an imposition on accountants of a continuing duty to disclose
in regard to representations made in a financial statement filed with the
commission, but not so in regard to all other documents filed with a national
exchange.
Since, under generally accepted accounting principles, and under section
11 of the 1933 act, accountants have a duty to continue reasonable account-
ing procedures up to the date of distribution, there should be little difficulty
for a court to find that 10b-5 imposes a duty to disclose facts which come
to the accountant's attention before the date of distribution. Thus, if after
certification but before distribution an accountant acquires new facts and
fails to disclose them, or, should he negligently fail to acquire them, it ap-
pears that he should be liable under 10b-5.
Neither the securities legislation nor the accounting profession, however,
require an accountant to continue his audit or checking procedures beyond
the date of distribution. Thus, an accountant would not be liable for failure
to discover facts after the date of distribution. If, however, the accountant
does acquire knowledge of facts which make the distributed audit misrepre-
sentative, does the accountant have any duty of disclosure under 10b-5? It
is submitted that the imposition of such a duty would be consistent with both
the general purpose of the securities legislation and the disclosure require-
ment under 10b-5. Again, it may be helpful to analogize to other sections of
the legislation. Under section 11(b) (2) of the 1933 act, if any registration
statement which the accountant knows to be false or misleading becomes
effective without his knowledge, the accountant will be civilly liable unless
he severs his relations with the issuer and gives public notice that the regis-
tration statement became effective without his knowledge. While the analogy
is not exact, the disclosure provisions in section 11 manifest a legislative
intent that when false or misleading information is distributed to the public,
steps should be taken to make the public aware of the misleading nature of
the information. This concern is consistent with the general legislative pur-
pose of insuring that the public will be provided full and accurate informa-
tion regarding securities.
It is submitted that the advantages gained by a disclosure requirement
beyond the date of distribution under rule 10b-5 outweigh the disadvantages.
Such a duty, however, would be a limited one. There would be no duty to
conduct reasonable investigation to acquire information beyond the date of
149
 The date the registration statement becomes effective is analogous to the date of
distribution in this discussion.
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distribution, but the accountant would be required to make reasonable public
disclosure of any information that is acquired if failure to disclose would
make the information already distributed misleading. The disadvantage of
inconvenience to accountants would be minimal. Any court which interpreted
10b-5 to impose such a duty ought carefully to define what constitutes rea-
sonable public disclosure. Certainly, a notice in a publication of national
distribution (e.g., The Wall Street Journal, Barrons) could be found to con-
stitute a reasonable method of discIosure. 15° This requirement would assure
that misleading information distributed to the public wilI be corrected when-
ever possible.
JOSEPH GOLDBERG
WALTER F. KELLY, JR.
150 Other methods could be considered equally reasonable, such as sending notifica-
tion to all persons initially receiving the misleading financial statements; notifying the
SEC and/or the national exchanges.
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